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THE GRANVILLE ESTATE AND NORTH CAROLINA
Governor Vance, in his Sketches of North Carolina, says:
*
"In the leafy month of June, i666, that merry monarch and
somewhat dissolute man, Charles the Second, by the grace of
God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, King, Defender of
the Faith, etc., etc.,. was graciously pleased to grant unto his
'right trusty and well beloved cousin and counsellor Edward,
Earl of Clarendon, our high Chancellor of England; our right
trusty and entirely beloved cousin and counsellor George, Duke
of Albemarle, Master of our horse'; and, with like expressions
of courtesy and insincere regard, to-the Earl of Craven, Lord
Berkley, Lord Ashley Cooper, Sir George Carterett, Sir John
Colleton and Sir William Berkley, the most magnificent domain
ever conferred by a Sovereign upon subjects in modem times,
or perhaps in all time. Little did Charles know what he was
doing, or did these subjects know what they were receiving."
Bancroft says of these objects of royal generosity:
"The historian Clarendon, the covetous though experienced
minister, hated by the people, faithful only to the King; Monk,
so conspicuous in the restoration, and now ennobled as the
Duke of Albemarle; Lord Craven, a brave cavalier and old
soldier of the German discipline, supposed to be husband to
the Queen of Bohemia; Lord Ashley Cooper, afterward Earl
of Shaftsbury, Sir John Colleton, a royalist of no historical
notoriety; Lord John Berkley, with his younger brother, Sir
William Berkley, the Governor of Virginia, and the passionate,
ignorant and not too honest, Sir George Carterett-were con(671)
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stituted proprietors and immediate sovereigns of the Province
of Carolina, reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to the 'South
Seas,' and from the 29th to the 3 6th Degrees of Northern
Latitude."
The grantees were to hold of the King and his successors "in
free socage, as part of the manor of East Greenwich in Kent,
with as ample immunities as are possessed by the Bishops of
Durham in England, yielding and paying a yearly rent of
twenty marks and one-fourth of all gold and silver ore found
within the said Province." They were "constituted by their
charters, the true and absolute Lords and Proprietors of the
before described Province, with power to divide the Province
into Counties and Baronies. By the assent of the Freemen
thereof, to ordain and publish laws for the Government of the
whole, or the respective parts, and to enforce their laws by the
infliction of penalties, even capital, if necessary, to relieve and
pardon offences---constitute Ports at which alone vessels should
be laden and unladen . . ., to alien the lands granted or
any part thereof, to be holden of themselves, notwithstanding
the statute of Quia Emptores, to confer titles of honor so as they
be not the same with those conferred by the King of Englandand power to set up and maintain a government in the said
Province." Pursuant to the powers conferred by this grant, or
charter, the Lords Proprietors established a government and
many colonists came and settled within its boundaries. John
Locke, at the request of Shaftsbury, prepared for the government of "the dawning States," a perfect constitution, worthy to
endure throughout all ages, known as "The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina," or "Locke's Grana Model." The effort
to put into effect this elaborate scheme of government, in the
forests of Carolina, proved a failure and was soon abandoned.
All of the Lords Proprietors, or their assigns, except Lord John
Carterett, who had succeeded to the title of Sir George, who died
1696, on the fifth day of July, 17:29, conveyed to the King all of
their rights, titles and estates, royalties, franchises, privileges
and immunities in and to the lands covered by the grant. Thereafter, Carteret filed his petition to have one-eighth part allotted
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to him in severalty. Pursuant to an act of Parliament, Commissioners were appointed to make partition and a line was
established by which one-eighth part of said land, being that portion thereof lying south of the line separating North Carolina
and Virginia, west of the Atlantic Ocean, and north of "a cedar
stake set upon the sea side in the latitude of thirty-five degrees
and thirty-four minutes north latitude, and from that stake by a
west line as far as the bounds of the Charter granted to the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina by his Majesty King Charles Second"
was set apart to him. This report was duly confirmed and,
pursuant thereto, Lord Carteret executed a deed releasing to the
King "all his estate, right, title and interest of, in and to the
government of said Province of Carolina and to said seveneighth parts divided from the said one-eighth part,' so allotted
to the said John, Lord Carterett.
His Majesty, George II, on September 17, 1744, gave,
granted and assigned to Lord Carterett, the one-eighth part of
said land with all quit rents, etc., due on account thereof. After
the execution of the deed of 1729, the Colony was governed by
the King through royal Governors appointed by him. The
laws were made by the Assembly and Council, subject to the
approval of the King. Lord Carterett, who became Earl Granville, appointed agents and opened offices for entry and grant to
individuals of the lands allotted to him. Friction arose between
the people and Granville's agents, resulting in a number of acts
of the Assembly, much disturbance and, sometimes, violence in
the Colony.
The delegates elected to the Provincial Congress held at
Halifax on November I8, 1776, for "the particular purpose of
framing a Constitution," adopted a "Declaration of Rights," the
twenty-fifth section of which declared that:
"The property in the soil, in a free government, being one
of the essential rights of the collective body of the people, it is
necessary, in order to avoid future disputes, that the limits of
the State should be ascertained with precision. . . . All the
territory, seas, waters, harbors with their appurtenances, lying
between the lines above described (Virginia and South Carolina) are the right and property of the people of the State to be
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held by them in Sovereignty . ... Provided further, that
nothing herein contained shall affect the titles or possession
of individuals holding, or claiming, under the laws heretofore
in force, or grants heretofore made by the late King George II,
or his predecessors, or the late Lords Proprietors, or any of
them."
At this time the lands within the boundaries of the State
were included in one of the following classes:
(i) The land, within the boundary of the grant by the
Lords Proprietors to the King, July 5, 1729, being all of the
lands covered by the original grant, except that portion set apart
and granted to Lord Carterett.
(2) The land allotted and granted to Lord Carterett by the
King, September 17, 1744.
The exceptions within these two classes comprised:
(i) Lands for which the Lords Proprietors had issued
grants to individuals prior to July 5, 1729.
(2) Lands for which the King had issued grants to
individuals subsequent thereto and prior, to July 4, 1776.
(3) Land for which Earl Granville had issued grants prior
to July 4, 1776, estimated to be three hundred thousand acres,
reserving quit rents of sixty thousand pounds sterling.
That the title to the lands held by the King, on July 4, 1776,
vested in the people when they renounced allegiance to the Crown
and established a new and independent political sovereignty
followed by the successful Revolution, was never drawn into
controversy, nor was any question raised in regard to the title
to lands held by individuals who came within the proviso to the
twenty-fifth section of the Declaration of Rights. The great
controversy which arose, after the Revolution, related to the
lands owned by Earl Granville. To have a clear understanding
of the interesting questions involved in this controversy, it is
necessary to note, in addition to the Declaration of Rights, the
legislation enacted by the General Assembly of North Carolina,
in regard to confiscations, entries and grants, the provisions of
the Treaty of 1783 between the United States and Great
Britain, and the status of individuals holding grants under the
several sources named. A number of such individuals were
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residents of England on July 4, 1776, and remained loyal subjects of the King. Among these were the heirs and devisees of
Earl Granville who died February 12, 1776. Others, upon the
separation of the Colony, and the organization of the new State,
left America and went either to England, or some of her
Colonies-remaining loyal to the King. They constituted the
Loyalists of those days. A number of persons residing in and
who became citizens of other American States, held grants for
land within this State.
At the November Session, 1777, the legislature enacted a
Confiscation Act, declaring that:
"All lands to which any person had title on July 4, 1776,
and who, on that day, was absent from the United States, and
still is absent, or hath attached himself to the enemy, or since
that day hath removed from the United States and remains
absent, shall be and are confiscated unless, at the first Assembly
to be held after the first of October, 1778, he shall appear and
become a citizen."
No other persons were named and no provision was made,
in this act, for seizing or selling any of the lands declared to be
confiscated.
At the January Session, 1779, an act was passed reciting
that the penalties of the Act of 1777 had been incurred, and that
the lands of all such persons as came within the provisions of
the act "are forfeited to the State." This act provides for the
appointment of commissioners to take possession of the confiscated lands, to examine persons on oath, to discover such
lands, to register their proceedings and make report thereof to
the County Court. No persons are named as coming within its
provisions.
At the October Session of the same year, another act was
passed in which a number of persons, not including Earl Granville, were named, whose lands, as well as those who came under
the penalties of the first act, were declared to be confiscated.
Commissioners were named with authority to sell the confiscated
lands.
At the Session of 1782 an act was passed in which a large
number of persons, whose lands are declared to be confiscated,
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are named, not including Earl Granville. The lands of these
persons are directed to be sold by seven Commissioners named
in the act. By the third section of this act it is recited that the
property of sundry other persons have been seized by the Commissioners as confiscated under former acts and "some differences have arisen, or may arise, respecting the legal forfeiture
of the same." The Commissioners are directed to give notice to
all persons who may claim the same to appear and show cause,
etc. No other confiscation acts were enacted prior to the Treaty
of 1783. At the Session of November, 1777, the legislature
enacted a statute opening to entry, "all of the lands which have
not been granted by the Crown of Great Britain, or the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina, or any of them, in fee before the fourth
day of July, 1776, or which have accrued or shall accrue to the
State byTreaty of Conquest." The only reference in this act
to the Granville lands is found in the fifteenth section, which
secures to persons "who, in the office of the late Earl Granville
*

have heretofore made an entry or entries or who, since

the death of the said Earl Granville, hath .possessed and actually
improved any vacant and unappropriated land, etc." priority in
taking out a grant therefor. Other entry laws were passed
prior to the Treaty of 1783, irnone of which is any other specific
provision made relating to the Granville lands. Among many
others, General William R. Davie, Nathaniel Allen, grandfather
of the late Allen G. Thurman of Ohio, and Josiah Collins, made
entry, November, 1788, upon, and procured, grants from the
State, for large and valuable tracts, within the bounlaries of the
Granville lands. The first public record in which it appears that
the heirs of Granville made claim to the land, after the Revolution, is a letter sent by Governor Martin, April 22, 1784, to the
General Assembly "from one of our delegates covering sundry
papers presented to the Ministers of the United States, at Paris,
to wit, one without a signature, stating the title which the heir
of the late Earl Granville sets up to a certain territory in this
State." It does not appear from the legislative journals that
the General Assembly took any notice of "the papers."
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Nothing further is found upon the public records of the
State, relating, specifically, to the claim of the Granville heirs
until i8oi, when two actions of ejectment were brought by
George William, Earl Coventry, successor, by devise, to the title
of Earl Granville against Nathaniel Allen and Josiah Collinsand against William R. Davie. The correspondence between
John London, Esq., of Wilmington, N. C., agent for the Granville claimants, and William Gaston, beginning in 18oi, and continuing until January 4, i8o8, together with other papers in the
possession of the North Carolina Historical Commission, presents an interesting history of what Governor Swain says was
"a case involving most intricate legal questions, and the title to
property of greater value than any other ever litigated before an
American tribunal." The plaintiffs were represented by William
Gaston, Esq., later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and
Edward Harris, Esq. The defendants, by M. Woods, Esq., a lawyer of eminent learning, and Judge Duncan Cameron, to whom
Governor Swain says, "great honors and emoluments were well
and justly awarded," and the former Attorney General, Blake
Baker, Esq. Only such reference is made to the history of the
Granville lands as are deemed necessary to present the interesting, and in many respects, novel questions which arose upon the
record.'
By depositions taken in England, the chain of title, beginning with the original grant to the Lords Proprietors, the grant
by King George II to
arterett for the one-eighth part
allotted to him in the partition of 1744, the will under which
plaintiff claimed, etc., was clearly established. The case came
on for trial before the Circuit Court at Raleigh, Chief Justice
Marshall presiding, with District Judge Potter, at June Term,
1805. The record shows that the Chief Justice took no part,
"utterly declining to give any opinion thereon." Governor
Swain says:
"Marshall, Chief Justice, from personal consideration,
peremptorily declining to sit upon the trial."
'A history of "The Granville Districte' may be found in "The James
Sprunt Historical Publications." Vol. x3, No. x, Coulter.
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Upon the conclusion of the evidence, Mr. Gaston moved
for judgment as upon a demurrer to defendant's evidence.
Thus, the argument presented clearly the questions of law in
the case at bar, involving only a small body of land, but in their
larger application, involving the title to two-thirds of the State,
thirteen of the largest and most populous counties and extending
westwardly to the "South Seas," with the exception of those
portions granted to individuals by Granville prior to July 4,
1776. The carefully prepared brief of Gaston, with its divisions
and subdivisions of "points," "objections" and citations from
Vattell, Rutherford, Blackstone, English and American decisions, together with his "Argument" and the "Argument" of
Judge Cameron, enable us to see with what thorough and careful preparation these lawyers in the early days of the last
century prepared and argued the "great cause."
Mr. Gaston, appreciating the- burden which he carried, in
arguing for the devisee of Earl Granville, a name *cordially
detested by the people, and whose ownership of the vast domain
inVolved had occasioned, for more than half a century, endless
friction and trouble to the- Colony, said:
"When the circumstances under which I arise to address
Your Honors are distinctly considered, it will not be deemed
strange that I feel somewhat of embarrassment and confusionthe importance of the cause-the general interest and universal
expectation which it has excited, the many new and difficult questions which it opens for solution, might well occasion the most
experienced and the most learned advocate to advance to the discussion with diffidence and apprehension. .

.

. The very bold-

ness of the enterprise inspires a species of courage. Counsel is
animated by the consciousness that the duty he is to discharge
tho' arduous, is highly honorable, and he is cheered by the conviction that those to whom he addresses himself, have not only
acuteness to discern the merits of a cause, but the goodness to
overlook the defects of the advocate. The case comes before
the Court upon a demurrer to evidence. It must be gratifying
to every friend of the exact and impartial administration of
justice that, involving, as it does, such important principles and
such high interests, it should be thus presented for decision on
its plain and naked merits, freed from all disputes about facts
and disembarrassed from every cavil of form. As the interests
of my clients are concerned, I can not but rejoice that an opportunity is now afforded them of having the merits of their claim
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fairly, fully, deliberately and dispassionately considered-so
that, even should the decision be ultimately adverse to their
wishes, they may rest satisfied that it is the decision of the law.
But, as it regards the honor of my native State, I still more
rejoice at the course which the cause has taken. Her honor
imperiously required that a claim like this should be openly and
boldly met-that the determination of it should rest with a
tribunal above all suspicion of favor, or prejudice, and whose
decision, however it might affect her interests, could leave no
stain upon her reputation."
He made, after the "opening," a clear and accurate statement of the facts disclosed by the evidence, concluding:
"From this statement, it appears that, on the i2th of February, 1776, the devisees of Lord Granville had an indisputable
title to the land now sued for. Unless, therefore, it can be
clearly shown that this title has been legally divested, it must
follow that they are yet its owners and have a right to demand
the judgment of the Court in their favor."
He proceeds to state the grounds upon which the defendants
claim title. (i) That the title of Earl Granville was extinguished by the Revolution. (2) That it was vested in the collective body of the people of North Carolina by the twenty-fifth
section of the Bill of Rights. (3) That it had been confiscated.
(4) That the devisees of Earl Granville were aliens and incapable of taking and holding lands in this State. .(5) That their
action was barred by the statute of limitations.
From Judge Cameron's "Argument" it appears that Mr.
Gaston fairly and correctly stated defendants' "Contentions."
It was on the two first positions-the effect of the Revolution
upon the title of Earl Granville, and the language of the proviso
to the twenty-fifth section of the Declaration of Rights, that
both counsel exhibited the largest range of study and reflection
and rested their case. These contentions involved the determination of the character and incidents of the tenure by which
Granville held title. Gaston argued that these questions were
not to be decided by reference to municipal law, but by "the
principles of right reason and natural equity-and, by the sentiments of the most approved and authoritative writers on the
subject of universal law, according to all these, no position seems
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to me more clearly established than this-that private rights
however their enjoyment, may be suspended, are not extinguished
by national quarrels, civil wars or revolution of Government."
To this argument Cameron replied that the status of Granville, in respect to the lands held by him, removed him from the
protection accorded to private ownership of property. He
argued, very forcibly, that by the original Charter, the Lords
Proprietors were empowered to, and did in fact, set up a government-by their appointees, made and enforced laws, appointed
judges and other officers and maintained and exercised all of the
functions of political sovereignty, subject only to their ultimate
allegiance to the King. That while Earl Granville had, by his
grant to the King in I744 "parted with the empty and unprofitable insignia of Royalty, though he gave up for himself and his
heirs the right of legislation, of life and death, of peace and war,
of building forts, garrisons, etc., of regulating trade and religion and of granting titles of nobility, he retained the great,
important and substantial right of granting lands to be held of
him rnd his heirs and not of the King and his heirs." That he
opened entry offices, appointed surveyors and agents to issue
grants, etc., concluding:
"This statement of facts contradicts the idea that Lord
Granville's rights were like the rights of other individuals, and
proves that, as far as it concerned the prioperty in the soil; the
right of disposing of it, and the consequences of tenure under
one or the other, the royal and proprietary rights were the
same. Both were sovereign in their respective territories. In
this situation did the rights of the Crown and Lord Proprietors stand in the year 1776, a year which witnessed the
emancipation of a Nation, which gave freedom to millions and
will ever be held in sacred remembrance by the votaries of
liberty."
From this position he argued that the title of Earl Granville, as that of the King, by virtue of the separation of the
Colony from the Ciown, was extinguished and vested in the
people of the State. That, from the moment that the Declaration of Independence was made, the war between the United
States and Great Britain became a public war.
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"When the State was dissolved (by which I mean the
former established government) a new sovereignty arose. The
people, who had been subjects, became rulers, and as they had
the supreme control of all within the limits of the State and
in fact possessed the only legitimate right to the exercise of
sovereignty within those limits; the existence of any other
sovereignty within the same limits would be directly incompatible with the first."
To this line of argument, Mr. Gaston replied, insisting that,
by the cession of Granville, in the grant of 1744, of all governmental and political authority and power granted to the Lords
Proprietors, and the acceptance from the King of the grant for
the one-eight part of the soil, his title became subject only to
those incidents attaching to the tenure of all others, who held
grants from the King. Referring to the grant of 1744, he said:
"It will be found that he retained none of the powers and
franchises which had relation to the Government of the
Province, none which was inconsistent with the condition of a
private subject. In no respect did his devisees differ from the
subjects of the King possessing property in this country, except
that they held lands to a greater extent and had annexed to
their ownership the right of subinfeudation. It will not be
alleged that the nature of their right is to be ascertained from
the quantum of their property. Does then the last discriminating circumstance require that they should be regarded not
as subjects but as sovereigns-their property be viewed not as
individual but as national? The only benefit derivable from the
power of subinfeudation is the right of escheat."
That the trial and its results had been the subject of popular
discussion is shown by Mr. Gaston's observation:
"It will not be urged here, I suppose, as it had been out of
doors, that one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid
of the Granville claim. Should it be, it would be sufficient to
ask where is the object assigned. The oppression of the British
King and Parliament-their exhorbitant pretensions to bind the
Colonies in all cases whatever. What would have been the
effect had the Granville claimants taken part with America in
the contest? Yet the part they should take could not vary the
nature of their interest, nor render it more or less repugnant
to the principles of the New Government."
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Judge Cameron, in reply, said:
"For the purpose of excepting the plaintiff's case from the
operation of these general principles, founded in the law of
Nature and of Nations, it has been much insisted on, that the
plaintiff's rights are of the nature of individual rights, and do
not come within those principles applicable to the case of sovereign rights, and for the purpose of proving this position,
it is stated the right of escheat is the only right consequential
on tenure under Earl Granville. In my opinion enough has
been stated to prove that the Proprietor's rights are not of the
nature of individuals but sovereign rights; but the right of
escheat proves it."
He proceeds to make an exhaustive examination of the law
of escheat as an incident to feudal tenure, etc., concluding with
the declaration that if, by the Revolution, the people had not
destroyed all claims inconsistent with the free, absolute and
unlimited exercise of sovereignty, "in vain, then, have been the
labors of the free people of North Carolina. They have pursued the shadow while they have suffered the substance to
escape them."
Mr. Gaston, discussing the effect upon the Granville title of
the twenty-fifth section of the Declaration of Rights, asserting
title to all of the land within the boundaries of the State to be in
the people, said:
"To this general declaration there are some reservations
and exceptions of which the only one material to the present
discussion is the third. This provides that nothing in the said
section contained shall affect the titles, or possessions of individuals holding or claiming under the laws heretofore in force,
etc. By the declaratory part of this section, say they, the people
assume to themselves collectively, their right of property in all
the lands within the bounds of the State, not heretofore appropriated and vested in individual citizens in the manner described
in the proviso."
The defendants relied upon an opinion rendered by Judge
Johnson, of the Court of Conference, in Faris v. Simpson,2
holding that the proviso to the twenty-fifth section of the Declaration of Rights saving the title of indiiriduals to whom grants
2i N. C. 294 (i8oi).
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had been issued by the King or the Lords Proprietors, prior to
July 4, 1776, applied only to such individuals as were of the
"collective body of the people." Judge Johnson said:
"The declaratory or enacting part of the clause regards
the citizens or body of the people collectively, within the boundaries therein described, and confess no territorial rights, except
to them; the saving in the proviso is to secure to individuals
of that collective body of the people their separate and individual titles to their lands, but can not, as I apprehend, mean
or intend to secure titles to lands, or vest in individuals, not
individuals of the collective body of the people of this State,
but aliens and foreigners who bad never become parties to the
compact on which our government was formed, not residing
within the limits of its territory."
Judge Taylor, later Chief Justice, did not concur in that
opinion, but concurred in the decision upon other grounds. In
referring to Judge Johnson, Mr. Gaston said:
"No one can entertain a stronger affection for the virtues,
or a higher reverence for the talents, of that most respectable
gentleman, than myself. But so numerous, and to me, such
weighty objections oppose themselves to the construction
adopted by him of the clause in question, that it is impossible
for my mind to acquiesce in it. Its novelty alone is sufficient
to excite strong doubts of its correctness."
He proceeds to show that:
"Innumerable cases have occurred, many soon after the
formation of the Bill of Rights, in which this exposition would
have been resorted to had it been known.

.

.

.

In the cele-

brated case of Bayard v. Singleton, 3 decided for the defendant
upon another principle, much property was at stake-the first
professional characters of the State were concerned as counselthe arguments were very elaborate and at great length, but we
hear no intimation of this construction. Yet, this construction,
if correct, would at once have put an end to the claims of the
plaintiffs. Is not this sufficient to show that such an exposition was not then thought of? Let it be remembered too that
it is sanctioned by the approbation of one Judge only, and
expressly denied by another. May it not have arisen from
assuming, as certain, what is now to be shown, if possible, that
the Granville claim was extinguished and from an inability to
discover any other method by which it had been destroyed."
ixMartin Rep. 48 (N. Car. 1787).
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He thereupon proceeded to analyze the twenty-fifth section
of the Bill of Rights and the proviso. In respect to the latter
he said:
"It is provided that nothing in said Declaration of Rights
contained shall affect the title or possession of individuals holding or claiming under the laws heretofore in force or grants made
by the late King George III or his predecessors or the late Lords
Proprietors or any of them. Individuals, unrestricted by any
epithet, any modification, must mean individuals of every description. There is nothing that warrants a constructive restriction of the general meaning. There is no argument of
inconvenience that requires it. .

.

. The proiso does not

secure those persons in the enjoyment of the land they had
formerly held. It declares only that the enacting part of the
section shall have no effect upon them either to protect or
destroy."
Mr. Gaston discussed, at much length and with force, the
construction of the proviso. His conclusion was especially
forceful:
"Let us bring to the view of the Court one more circumstance connected with the' exposition of the last section of the
Declaration of Rights and I will then no longer detain them
on this point of the case. No inconsiderable part of our statute
code is made up of Acts of Confiscation enacted during the
Revolutionary War. Where was the necessity of these acts,
if the construction of our Bill of Rights, asserted by the defendants, be correct? They are without use- and without meaning-calculated only to embarrass, perplex and deceive."
He then proceeds to examine the various confiscation laws
and to show that they were inconsistent with the construction
sought to be placed on the proviso-that if only the lands of
those who were members of the collective body of the people
were removed from the operation of the general words of the
section, there was no necessity for enacting confiscation actsthat the title of all persons not members of the collective body,
vested in the State by the operation of the twenty-fifth section,
all of the territory within the limits of the State. This argument was, of course, addressed to the question of the sense in
which the word "individuals" was used by the framers of the
Bill of Rights.
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In Bayard v. Singleton,4 the court held an act of the legislature unconstitutional and void. It attracted much attention at
the time and has been frequently cited. In that case, Iredell,
Johnson and Davie appeared for plaintiff-Moore and Nash for
defendant-claiming under the confiscation laws. The facts
5
disclosed show that Judge Johnson's opinion in Faris v. Simpson
would have been decisive of that case without regard to the confiscation law. The claimant there was not one of the "individuals" saved by the proviso. This was doubtless Mr. Gaston's
reason for saying that the opinion was "novel."
Judge
Cameron, referring to the language of the twenty-fifth section
of the Bill of Rights, said:
"Wherefore it was declared that all the territory was the
right and property of the people. By this declaration all rights
and property in the soil, whether belonging to the Crown, to
the Lords Proprietors or individuals, vested in the collective
body of the people. The property of Lord Granville was
divested and he was as completely stripped of all his rights as
tho' he had never been cloathed with them. It can not fairly
be imagined that Congress intended by the last proviso to
save the titles and possessions of any individuals, but those
who were parties to the compact. They were delegated by the
individuals forming, the collective body of the people of North
Carolina, for whom they were acquiring sovereignty and its
incidents; consequently they could only intend to save the rights
of those individuals and none others. If they had done otherwise, they would have exceeded their authority, violated their
trust, and acted traitorously to their country by preserving
those very titles which were intended to be destroyed. Besides,
the rights of Lord Granville had always been looked upon and
regarded as sovereign rights, and it is evident were so considered by Congress in contra-distinction to individual titles."
. He insisted that it was the titles of individuals of the collective body which were under their care and protection in framing the proviso and not the titles and possession of the Crown
and Lords Proprietors.
"Over the one, they threw the shield of protection; against
the other they drew the sword of destruction."
'Supra, note 3.

'Supra, note 2.
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Judge Cameron's analysis of the language of the provisothe construction of the word "individuals," etc., while interesting, is not so convincing as that portion addressed to the evident
intention of the framers of the Bill of Rights-read in the light
of the history of the contests and controversies which had
existed and excited the feelings of the people for many years
preceding the Revolution, it was manifestly their purpose to
extinguish the title of Lord Granville. Judge Cameron quoted
very largely the opinion of judge Johnson in Faris v. Simpson,'
and Marshall v. Lovelass7 and said:
"Of these opinions it has been said that they are novel.
*

.

.

I beg leave to remark that Mr. Johnson has been

always considered one of the first law characters in this State.
He was a member of the profession and occupied a high rank
in it, long before the Revolution. He was an early and active
agent ih the Revolution and a member of some of the first
Congresses and Assemblies held under the new government.
Of course he was well acquainted with the affairs of it, and
with the objects of all the public acts, done under its authority;
and a construction placed by him on one of those acts, is more
to be relied on,. than that by one who was not contemporary
with making of those acts and had consequently not the same
means of information. No occasion ever called for an exposition of the Bill of Rights until the year i8oo. In truth every
person, whether in Europe or America, acquiesced in the practical construction put on this section from the year 1776 up to
that time and made no question about it. The opinions, therefore, of Mr. Johnson ought not to be suspected or viewed with
caution on account of novelty, because they only judicially
declare that construction which the section had for twentysix years uniformly, tho' silently received." 8
It is doubtless true that, in the opinion and estimation of
the people, Earl Granville's title was regarded as a continuation
of that of the Lords Proprietors and himself as one of them. It
was upon this theory and the exclusion of his title from the
proviso to the twenty-fifth section, that defendants relied to
Supra, note 2.
I N. Car. 325 (180i).
'For Judge Johnson's relation to the Halifax Convention of November,
1776, see McRee's Life of Iredell, Vol. I, p. 335.
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sustain their position that Earl Granville's title was divested.
Judge Cameron said:
"The defendants derive their title under the State which
has granted the land in fee to them by an Act of Assembly
passed the 15th of November, 1777."9

He concludes this branch of his argument, saying:
"From all of which, I conclude that those who had framed
the Bill of Rights, and those who were afterwards called on to
legislate on it, were of the opinion that either by the natural
effect of the Revolution, or by the Bill of Rights and Declaration of Independence, the property had been vested in the collective body of the people of North Carolina and that they were
entitled to dispose of it in the manner deemed most advantageous to the whole community and that those to whom portions
of it might be allotted for the purpose of settlement, and improvement, would enjoy it free and undisturbed."
While Judge Cameron also relied upon the confiscation
acts, it is quite clear that he recognized the difficulties which
were encountered by the decision of the court in Faris v.
Simpson,' that, under the Act of 1777, titles were not divested

out of persons coming within its operation without proceedings
had in the nature of office found. The record failed to show
that any proceedings were had against Earl Granville or that
any seizure of his lands was made or any other act done as the
statute prescribed prior to the Treaty of 1783. Of course, if
Earl Granville's title had not been divested by the twenty-fifth
section of the Declaration of Rights and, if the confiscation acts
did not, without inquest of office or seizure, etc., operate to
divest such title, the Treaty of 1783, and later of i794, which
provided that no future confiscations be made, protected the
Granville title and the grant to defendants in November, 1788,
conferred no title. On the question of the inability of the
devisees of Earl Granville to take the title because of alienage,
the depositions showed the death of John, Earl Granville, 1763,
leaving Robert his heir who devised to Coventry September,
1772, and died February 12, I776-hence, at the date upon
'The first act establishing offices for receiving entries, etc.
1

Supra, note 2.
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which title vested, the plaintiffs were not aliens. Judge Cameron
did not argue this question nor the statute of limitations, but
concluded by saying:
"Neither the counsel nor the Court can derive much assistance in the consideration of this cause from books. It has not
its parallel in all the records of history. It is perfectly sui
generis. It would, therefore, be improper to govern it by rules
and principles, devised for, and adapted to cases arising out of
different circumstances. It must be determined by the principles and reasons growing out of its own circumstances. It
must be decided with a due regard to those sacred and immutable principles of justice which unequivocably pronounce judgment in favor of the freemen of this State. The question, may
it please the Court, is interesting and awful. It is no less than
whether it shall be put in the power of those attached to the
principles and prerogatives of Monarchy, entertaining a mortal
hatred for Republican Institutions, after their long acquiescence,
to take the lands from those to whom the State has granted
it, those educated in the same country and possessing the same
political principles; to lay the foundation of discord and dissensions, and put at hazard the liberties of our country. This
qtiestion, momentous as it is in its nature and consequences, I
leave with this Honorable. Court, in the hope and confidence
that it will be decided faithfully, impartially and without respect to persons."
The record at June Term, 1805, of the Court, states:
"The motion made in the cause at the last Term, to discharge the demurrer to evidence being further argued, it was
ordered by His Honor, Judge Potter (His Honor the Chief
Justice utterly declining to give an opinion thereon), that
the said demurrer thereon be discharged and that a jury be
again empannelled to try the issue of fact, joined between
the plaintiff and the defendants in this cause. To which said
opinion and order, the counsel for the plaintiffs did then and
there in open Court except."
The Raleigh Register, June 24, 1805, contains the following notice of the trial and its incidents:
"The Circuit Court for this District adjourned on Friday last. .

.

. The cause of the Earl Granville's devisees,

which has excited so much public expectation in this state,
came on to be heard upon the motion made at December
Term, to strike out the demurrer to the evidence. And after
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argument of counsel, the District Judge delivered his opinion at considerable length, stating the progress of the cause,
the ground of the motion, and the reasons for his opinion;
and concluded by saying, that the Plaintiff demurred improperly-that the Defendants joined in the demurrer improperly-and that the whole impropriety should be stricken
out and an alias venire facias awarded. This being the judgment of the Court, the cause will of course be referred to a
jury again; and it is believed, will be tried at the next term.
The continuance at this term was granted at the instance of
the Plaintiff's counsel, who were not prepared for an argument to the jury.
"The Chief Justice gave no opinion upon the motion, nor
does he intend to deliver one on the main question. He
stated from the bench his reasons for thus declining, saying,
that at a former term he enquired of the counsel if this case
depended upon a construction of the treaty of peace; that if
it did, he should give no opinion, because he had formed an
opinion upon that subject so firmly, that he did not believe
he could change it; and as that opinion was formed when
he was very deeply interested (alluding to the cause of Lord
Fairfax in Virginia) he should feel much delicacy in deciding the present question; but upon being informed that the
treaty of peace would make no part of the case, he felt himself freed from that delicacy and intended to deliver his
opinion. It seemed, however, that upon the argument, the
defence assumed the principle of alienage, thereby involving
the case with the treaty of peace, and made that question
an important point. The only part of the case on which he
entertained any doubt was the confiscation laws; and as he
could not satisfy himself that the plaintiff was included in
those laws, he could not consistently with his duty and the
delicacy he felt, give an opinion in the cause."
At the December Term, 1805, a jury was empannelled and,
under the instruction of Judge Potter, returned a verdict for
the defendants. A bill of exceptions filed and ordered to be
made a part of the record. Thus ended, in the Circuit Court,
the trial of this interesting and important cause.
Expressions in Mr. Gaston's argument, evidently prepared
before the trial, indicate that he expected Chief Justice Marshall
to preside with Judge Potter. Some interesting side lights are
thrown upon the subject by the letters of Mr. London. He wrote
Gaston, July 8, i8o5, referring to the "Granville causes," saying:
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"I must own the turn this business has taken occasioned
me some chagrin and disappointment; and tho' not altogether satisfactory, yet the favorable sentiments of Judge
Marshall encourage me to hope that we shall finally succeed;
at the same time you must permit me to observe that I think
the Judge's reasons for withdrawing from the cause partakes
more of political acquiescence than the dignified, official independence we had a right to expect from his character. He
said enough to convince our opponents he was unfavorable
to their construction of the law and, therefore, should not
have permitted incorrect principles to harass our clients and
create expensive delays. Mr. Marshall had certainly no interest in our cause, he ought to have governed the proceedings of a Court over which he presided, according to such
opinion-it has very much the appearance of shirking to
popular impressions."
After expressing approval of the course pursued by his
counsel in taking an exception to the ruling of Judge Potter on
the demurrer, Mr. London says that he wishes them, on the trial,
to insist on the Judge instructing the jury on the law of the case
and be prepared to apply for a writ of error.
"This is altogether-of a professional nature and can not
be in better hands than yours and therefore I rest in full
confidence that every exertion will be made to support our
client's claim and obtain that justice that an honorable and
independent judiciary can dispense-it is no doubt much in
our favor what has already dropt from the Chief Justice."
That, notwithstanding the result of the trial, much apprehension was felt as to the final result in the Supreme Court, is
indicated by Governor Stone's message to the legislature of
I8o9, in which he said:
"The extensive claim of the Earl of Granville's heirs for
a large portion of the territory of our State, now prosecuting in the Supreme Court of the Uiiited States, is a subject
in which the honor and interest of the State are greatly concerned. That becoming respect for her own dignity, which
has hitherto prevented the State from interfering and employing agents and councillors to advocate and support the
course which she has taken, will probably convince her of
the importance of making early provision to meet the justice
of the claim of her citizens for remuneration in case of a decision against the sufficiency of the title derived from her-
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self. And a possibility that a decision may be made against
the sufficiency of this title, when it is generally understood
that a greatly and deservedly distinguished member of that
Court, has already formed an unfavorable opinion, will probably enforce the consideration that it is proper to make some
eventual provision, by which the purchasers from the State,
and those holding under that purchase, may have justice done
them."
Nathaniel Allen, one of the defendants, in his will, executed
November 11, 18o5, authorized his executors to make such
compromise and adjustment, as they think proper, of the suit
"with the heirs or devisees of Earl Granville, so as to link their
claim with my estate." I learn from a lawyer of large and
accurate information in eastern Carolina that a similar provision
is to be found in many wills executed at, or about, that time.
While the record does not show upon which of the several
grounds relied upon by the defendants, Judge Potter based his
opinion discharging the demurrer and at the next term, instructing the jury to return a verdict for the defendants, a letter from
Mr. London bearing date April i9, i8o6, throws light upon the
subject. He writes:
"I feel much chagrin that we are put to so much trouble
and expense in this business, and which I fear is in great
degree to be attributed to the Chief Justice's delivery, for
tho' Mr. Potter's opinion might not have been different
from the one he gave, yet I think more caution and hesitation would have taken place in the minds of the jury and
probably afforded us the means of trying the pulses of another-certainly the Judge's construction of the deed of 1744
is a very hasty one-as to what he says on the application of
the Declaration of Rights as an extinguishment of the Granville Title, he has at least the merit, if incorrect, of not being
singular."'L
The criticism of Judge Marshall, by Mr. London, was not
shared in, nor approved by Mr. Gaston-his correspondence
with the Chief Justice, many years later, evince the highest
regard for him and his character. The cause was, by writ of
error, removed into the Supreme Court, but Mr. Gaston declined

"An evident reference to Judge Johnson's opinion.
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to follow it. Upon his advice, Mr. Phillip Barton Key, who
was retained to argue the cause for the plaintiff, wrote to Mr.
London, June 22, 1807:

"My own opinion is in favor of the claim on general
principles, nor do I see anything in the State Constitution
or laws to defeat it-construing them literally and to promote the object they intend. Our greatest apprehensions
result from a narrow and contracted policy, at once illiberal
and unworthy-strong prejudices, I know, are excited-very
difficult to be overcome, but to which our Supreme Court is
less liable than any other of our Institutions; before them I
am not without strong hopes of success."
And on January 4, i8o8, he wrote:
"My own opinion is most decided for a continuance of
the case, if the Court, and our adversaries will consent to
it-the present moment, in all points of view, is most inauspicious, as you will more readily perceive, by the measures
of the embargo, so fatal to our interests and so hostile in its
consequences to England. I have unlimited confidence in
our Judiciary, but the storm that is gathering round them is
alarming. I shall be prepared for trial if one is froced on, but
my opinion is for delay. It would give me pleasure to see
Mr. Gaston here."
Mr. London strongly urged Mr. Gaston to assist in arguing
the case in the Supreme Court. He says:
"I should repeat my solicitation for your aid. No pecuniary consideration, you may rest assured, should stand
as competition in the way."
He closes this, his last letter, found among the records, by
saying:
"I have been severely handled by the influenza."
Mr. London expresses "much chagrin," and was evidently
"much mortified" at the turn the "Granville causes" took. He
adhered to the opinion that Judge Marshall's "withdrawal from
the case" was not based upon satisfactory reasons. As was his
custom, Mr. Gaston endorsed each of the letters "Ansd." I
have not been able to find any of his letters to Mr. London. A
careful examination of Judge Gaston's letters, from i791 until
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his death, 1844, fails to disclose any reference to the "Granville
causes." He was a member of the General Assembly, and
Speaker, at the Session of i8o8, and a member of Congress,
from 1813 to 1817. The writ of error was dismissed February
4, i817. It is to be regretted that a cause involving such vast
interests and presenting so many novel and interesting questions,
should have terminated without, so far as can be found, any
judicial expression, other than the order of Judge Potter discharging the demurrer and giving a peremptory instruction to
the jury.
In an editorial note to an article in the University Magazine, May, i86i, it is said that Judge Potter published his opinion. It is not in the records of the Court at Raleigh. By a
paper, unsigned, and without date, found in the "Swain Collection," enclosed in a letter from Honorable M. King, of
Charleston, S. C., to Judge Gaston, December 17, 1842, "received
by the Consul at that place, through Sir John Barrow, Secretary
of the Navy," it appears that, in 1783 a petition was presented
by the claimants to the Commissioners appointed by Act of
Parliament for enquiring into the losses sustained by Loyalists
in America. They awarded a large sum for quit rents, but
"considered that they were not at liberty to take the loss of the
fee simple into consideration, but referred Lord Carterett's agent
to the Provision of the Treaty of Peace." The paper, which
appears to be a "Memorial," states that, at the trial of the case,
"so great was the excitement that the Judges were glad to
escape from the fury of the populace. . . . It has been
frequently represented to the agents of Lord Carterett that
the difficulty did not arise from any invalidity of title or any
question of Lord Carterett's exception from the saving
clauses in the Acts of Confiscation, inasmuch as it was not
contended that he or his ancestors had borne arms against
the United States, but the chief impediment arose from the
vast extent of territory embracing, as it does, 69 miles in
breadth from the Atlantic to the Mississippi across North
Carolina and Tennessee, lying on the Northland, adjoining
Virginia, . . . He is deterred from continuance of the
prosecution of his claim (i) Because of the proved impossibility of obtaining a trial in a country in which the whole
mass of the population are not only interested in the resist-
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ance of this claim, but have exhibited their determination to
prevent its legal investigation. (2) Because of the impossibility of carrying any verdict of ejectment into effect without a large army."
He says that he recognizes that
"morally the possessors who, by cultivation, have brought
the land into a profitable condition have the right to reap the
produce of their labor and so have established a title stronger
in justice than the legal right to the fee of the land would
present."
He adds that, as to the uncultivated lands sold by the State
"he contends that he has a reasonable claim upon the State for
the proceeds of that sale." It is further said that "in 1833 the
then claimant represented his case to the American Minister,
resident in London, but obtained no satisfactory answer." In
conclusion, he proposes:
"either that a portion of waste land should be set apart and
defined as his property and possession, given and granted to
him or his agents by the Government, or that a sum of money
should be paid to him for. the surrender of his title to the
whole."
This paper is interesting as presenting the claimant's point
of view and his last appeal for recognition of the claims of his
ancestor.
While there were other questions-stathite of limitations,
etc., upon which the case may have been decided, it is evident
that counsel for both parties recognized the fact that the record,
being argued, was a "test case" and that they sought to have a
decision upon grounds which would either establish or destroy
the Granville title. In the editorial note referred to, it is said:
"The intent and effect of the last section of the Declaration of Rights

.

.

.

was to confiscate the title of Earl

Granville."
The House of Commons, at the Session of May, 1784,
rejected a bill to repeal all laws inconsistent with the provisions
of the Treaty. It may be that this was caused by fear that in
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doing so, the Granville title might possibly be revived or the
State's title affected. The people of North Carolina, as shown
by a number of incidents, were very slow to surrender rights to,
or confer power upon, the federal government. The Assembly
refused to pass an act requiring the State officers, including its
members, to take an oath to support the Constitution. The
judges refused to obey a writ of certiorariissued by the Circuit
Court and the Assembly commended their action.
How far the possibility of endangering the validity of legislation regarding the Granville title, contributed to this state of
mind, is an interesting inquiry. That such apprehension was
not without foundation is shown by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court, a few years later, in Fairfax Devisees v.
Hunter.1 2 The North Carolina judges had held in several cases
that, under what Judge Taylor called "our system" of confiscation laws, title of owners of land coming with their provisions
was not divested until office found or some proceeding equivalent
thereto. Neither Earl Granville, nor his devisees, had been
named in any of the confiscation laws. No action had been
taken in regard to the Granville lands which was equivalent to
office found other than the issuing of grants for portions of them,
under the entry laws. This was held, in Fairfax v. Hunter,13
not equivalent to office found. It is true that in Smith v. Maryland,1 4 it was held that the Maryland act, by its express terms,
operated to divest the title out of the owner at whom it was
aimed, without any procedure. Our judges held otherwise.
It is manifest that defendants would have encountered
serious difficulty if compelled to defend their title upon the confiscation acts. Judge Marshall evidently thought the question
doubtful. It therefore seems that the ground upon which they
successfully resisted the claim of the devisee of Earl Granville
was the limitation placed by Judge Johnson in Faris v. Simpson,15 upon the third proviso, to the twenty-fifth section of the
"7 Cranch, 6D3 (U.S. 1813).
uSupra, note ii.
" 6 Cranch, 286 (U. S. 18io).
"Supra, note 2.
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Bill of Rights. Upon his construction of the proviso, limiting
its language to "individuals" who were "members of the collective body of the people of North Carolina," the title to land
of immense value, comprising thirteen counties, lying north of
the line beginning at a "cedar stake set upon the sea side and as
far westwardly as the original grant," depended. Of necessity,
and probably, happily, we can only conjecture the result of the
decision of the Supreme Court. That court may have followed
the construction placed by Judge Johnson upon the proviso as it
appears that Judge Potter did.
However this may have been, it was fortunate for the welfare of the people of this State that the Granville title was
extinguished. It rested upon no other foundation than the
fiction that, by right of discovery the King became the lord of
the soil with the right to bestow it upon his favorites according
to his bwn caprice. The Lords Proprietors either neglected or
abused the munificent gift. The statesmen who framed the
Declaration of Rights and -Constitution of the State, with the
aid of Judge Johnson, solved the problem with which they were
confronted, wisely and well. Apprehending that the case would
be decided adversely to the defendants, Governor Stone, for the
purpose of providing a fund with which to compensate those
who had taken grants from the State, said:
"And when the manner in which the territory has been
acquired is considered; and that it has been reclaimed from
a wilderness and rendered productive and valuable by the
labor of our citizens, the benefit of all which, if the validity
of the State title is decided against, will be transferred to
persons alien and hostile to our laws and government, a more
convenient source from whence to obtain this fund, or one
from which it may with more justice be derived, will not
readily suggest itself, than a tax upon the land, themselves,
in the hands of the Earl of Granville's heirs, after possession
shall have been recovered-besides and beyond the tax for
the ordinary purposes of government."
That portion of the lands included within the boundary of
the Granville grant, within this State, is now the home of more
than a million of happy, prosperous people, working out the
problems of the twentieth century, with wisdom and courage.
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My sole purpose in making a study of the records of this
interesting case and writing this sketch is to gratify a desire to
understand by what means the title to the Granville lands was
divested and how they were saved to the people of the State
who, as said by Governor Stone, "reclaimed them from a wilderness and rendered them productive and valuable by their labor."
While a successful prosecution of the writ of error would not
have resulted in the ejectment of the thousands of persons who
held under State grants, it would have imposed upon the people
of the State a heavy burden and involved many in vexatious and
expensive litigation. It is probable that the final chapter in the
history of the "Granville Causes" has not and will never be written. Why the parties permitted the writ of error to remain on
the docket of the United States Supreme Court for more than
ten years without an effort to bring it to a hearing, is not easy
to understand. The policy of inaction resulted well for the
*State and her grantees.
Henry G. Connor.
Wilson, North Carolina.

